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I. INTRODUCTION
A contract exchange, defined as an organized marketplace for the
creation or trading of specific contracts, provides benefits to its members as
well as the public at large.' But legal disputes can arise on contract
Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. For helpful
comments on prior drafts, I thank Amy Schmitz, Tony Casey, Erik Gerding, Allison
Schwartz and two anonymous reviewers, as well as participants in the Junior Business
Law Conference at the University of Colorado, the Federalist Society Junior Scholars
Workshop at the University of Iowa, and the Law & Economics of Arbitration and
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exchanges, just as they do anywhere else, and those disputes can be litigated,
mediated, arbitrated, or resolved in some other way. This Essay claims that
arbitration, rather than litigation, is a particularly useful and appropriate
means for resolving exchange-related disputes, and that this is true not only
for traditional contract exchanges, like the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT),
but also for online "consumer contract exchanges," 2 such as Priceline.com.
Arbitration is well suited to the task of deciding exchange-related
disputes for several reasons. For one, arbitration is designed to be a low-cost
imperfect substitute for litigation just as the contract exchange is designed to
be a low-cost imperfect substitute for face-to-face contracting. Other reasons
include the ability of exchange arbitrators to develop expertise in the specific
contracts traded on the exchange, and the convenience of consolidating
related claims in a single forum.
As evidence for the claim that arbitration is particularly valuable for
contract exchange disputes, the Essay will show that the vast majority of
disputes arising out of American commodities exchanges, are resolved
through arbitration, not litigation. This is so both for disputes between
members of an exchange, as well as for between members and their
customers. Indeed, arbitration is so important to contract exchanges that the
CBOT's official rules announce that a resort to litigation would be
fundamentally "contrary to the objectives and policy of the Exchange." 3
Traditional commodities exchanges like the CBOT are not the only type
of contract exchange. In recent years, widespread access to the Internet has
made it possible to organize a new type of "consumer contract exchange"
with an unlimited number of seats, where consumers are expressly invited to
participate. 4 The few consumer contract exchanges that exist rely primarily
on arbitration to resolve disputes arising on the exchange, just like their
commodities exchange forebears.
The nature of arbitration requires that judicial review of an arbitrator's

Alternative Dispute Resolution Public Policy Initiative sponsored by the Searle Civil
Justice Institute at George Mason University's Law & Economics Center (excluding
Christopher Drahozal, who recused himself). For strong research assistance, I thank
Meredith Ashlock. For editorial assistance, I thank Diana Avelis. For financial support, I
thank the Searle Civil Justice Institute.
I See Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer Contract Exchanges and the Problem of
Adhesion, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 313 (2011).
2 See id. at 334-35.
3 CHI. BD. OF TRADE RULEBOOK § 600.A (2013) [hereinafter CBOT RULEBOOK].

4 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 334-35.
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decision be minimal, and it is under current law. 5 But that does not mean that
the state plays no role in contract-exchange disputes. To the contrary, various
government departments, such as the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), regulate and oversee the structure and process of
exchange arbitration on an ongoing basis to ensure that the process is
sufficiently robust to be relied upon for just results.
This regulation of contract exchange arbitration has, inter alia, the
following salutary effect: It enhances the respect that courts will pay to the
regulated arbitration clause, process, and decisions. The foundation for this
enhanced respect is that the ex ante (regulatory) review acts as a substitute
for ex post (judicial) review of exchange-related arbitration. 6
In recent years, however, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has been
read by the Supreme Court to mandate a high level of judicial respect for
arbitration and arbitration clauses regardless of whether there was ex ante
regulatory approval. Given the other significant costs of regulatory oversight,
especially for a nascent and growing industry like consumer contract
exchanges, it may be wise to rely solely on the FAA to protect exchangerelated arbitration.
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I defines the concept of a contract
exchange, with a focus on consumer contract exchanges. Part II claims that
arbitration holds particular value for contract exchanges, and shows that realworld 'contract exchanges in fact make extensive use of arbitration. Part III
examines regulation of contract exchange arbitration and the benefit it can
provide, namely enhanced judicial respect.

II. CONTRACT EXCHANGES
This Part provides background on contract exchanges and enumerates
some of the important private and social benefits they provide. This Part also
briefly describes traditional contract exchanges, as well as a new form, the

5 The Federal Arbitration Act empowers courts to vacate arbitration decisions only
in extreme situations, such as that the award was procured through bribery or the
arbitrators exceeded their powers. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2014). See generally, e.g., Amy J.
Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional

Analysis, 37 GA. L. REv. 123, 145-51 (2002).
6 See, e.g., Belom v. Nat'1 Futures Ass'n, 284 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2002)
("[C]ourts should accord considerable weight to an executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme that it has been entrusted to administer.").
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consumer contract exchange.7
A. Definition
A "contract exchange" can be defined as a centralized and organized
marketplace for the origination or trading of specific contracts.8 A contract
exchange is similar to any other marketplace in that it brings many buyers
and sellers together in one place, except that traders buy and sell contracts for
goods or services-not the goods or services themselves. One well-known
type of contract exchange is a commodities exchange, like the CBOT, where
parties make and trade contracts for the future delivery of corn, wheat, and
other crops. Key features of contract exchanges include standardized forms
and a set of trading rules promulgated by the exchange itself.
B. Benefits
Contract exchanges are beneficial organizations that serve the interests of
their participants and the public at large.
Contract exchanges benefit participants by facilitating efficient,
anonymous transactions among strangers. By providing competitive, liquid
markets for standardized contracts, contract exchanges help parties obtain a
legitimate market price. Furthermore, exchange-traded contracts can be used
for a variety of business purposes, most notably to hedge risk. Contract
exchanges also reduce transaction costs in a variety of ways, including by
standardizing contracts and gathering buyers and sellers together in one
place.9
Contract exchanges also confer benefits on the broad public, including
nonparticipants. They help reduce the incidence of scarcity and glut by
providing insight into expected future market conditions.10 And by quickly
7 See generally, Schwartz, supra note 1, at 317-46.

8 Id., at 324.
9 Contract exchanges also provide a lawful and "legitimate outlet for speculative
capital" by providing a market able to absorb even very large transactions with little
effect on prices. JONATHAN LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 1859-1905, 22-23
(1979). And for traders on exchanges that employ clearinghouses or margin
requirements, counterparty risk is greatly reduced. Contract exchanges have been shown
to stabilize prices and reduce credit needs, time delays, and risk.
lo This is particularly important with respect to agricultural commodities, as scarcity
could lead to famine.
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and efficiently conveying useful information to markets, contract exchanges
are vitally important to overall economic growth.
There are some drawbacks to contract exchanges. For instance, they deny
contracting parties the ability to negotiate their agreements, making it
impossible for all parties to precisely meet to their needs.
These caveats aside, contract exchanges clearly are privately and socially
beneficial institutions. Indeed, Congress has encouraged or mandated their
use in a variety of settings, from derivatives and swaps to the home mortgage
market.'1

C. TraditionalContractExchanges
Contract exchanges have traditionally been located in large "exchange
halls" in major cities. 12 Only members of an exchange can trade on the floor.
Because space is limited in even the largest halls, only a relatively small
group of people can become members. Full membership is called a "seat,"
and it can be prohibitively expensive. 13 The result is that wealthy and
sophisticated parties have long reaped the many benefits of participating in
contract exchanges, but ordinary consumers have not.
The most familiar exchange today is probably the commodities futures
1 See, e.g. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 712, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
8302) (requiring that certain derivatives be traded on a contract exchange, rather than
over the counter, as in the past); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses

in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387, 388-89 n.2 (2013) (quoting the G-20 group of
major world economies as endorsing the idea that "[a]ll standardized OTC derivative
contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where
appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest"); Henry
T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary Purchasers on the

Form of Contracts,42 VAND. L. REv. 133, 147 (1989) (describing Congress's passage of
the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 whose "stated intent . . was to promote the
development of a national secondary market in conventional [residential] mortgages").
12 See Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 245
(1905) (The "main feature" of the CBOT is that "it maintains an exchange hall for the
exclusive use of its members, which now has become one of the great grain and provision
markets of the world. Three separated portions of this hall are known respectively as the
wheat pit, the corn pit, and the provision pit.").
13 The price of membership for the CBOT reached $300,000 in June 2012. Ann
Saphir & Tom Polansk, Chicago Board of Trade Seat Sales Hot Despite Chill on Floor,

REUTERS (Jul. 9, 2012, 6:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/09/usa-grainscbot-seats-idUSL2E813F7U20120709.
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markets based in Chicago.1 4 Until recently, the three futures exchanges in
Chicago were the CBOT, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the
MidAmerica Commodity Exchange.15 In 2007, the CBOT merged with the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, forming CME Group, Inc. ("CME Group"). 16
Traders are able to efficiently buy and sell futures through the open
outcry system and through electronic trading systems because they can rely
on the standardized terms in the contracts. For example, the butter futures
contract traded on the CME is for 40,000 pounds of USDA Grade AA frozen
butter, delivered to an approved warehouse "on any business day of the
contract month except that delivery may not be made prior to the third
business day following the first Friday of the contract month."' 7 Every butter
contract on the CME has identical terms, and no trader is permitted to alter
them in any way. And this standardization has the important effect of making
futures contracts into fungible commodities that can easily be priced and
traded on a liquid market.' 8

D. Consumer ContractExchanges
Contract exchanges have traditionally been located in large exchange
halls in major cities, as just discussed. In recent years, however, inexpensive
and widespread access to the Internet has rendered physical constraints
irrelevant for many purposes. A contract exchange no longer needs to have a
physical location to bring traders together in one place. A web-based contract
exchange can be just as centralized and organized as a physical one. And this
has made possible a new form of contract exchange-one without seats or
members-that welcomes the public (consumers) to directly participate,

14 Other futures exchanges are located in Minneapolis and New York.
1

5 KENNETH M. MORRIS & VIRGINIA B. MORRIS, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL GUIDE
To UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING 128 (Sophie Forrester et al. eds., 1999) (the
CBOT specialized in "grains, Treasury bonds and notes, precious metals and financial
indexes [sic]"; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange specialized in "meat . .. livestock, [and]
currency"; the MidAmerica Commodity Exchange specialized in "financial futures,
currency, livestock, grain, and precious metals").
16 Timeline
of
CME
Achievements,
CMEGRoUP.CoM,
http://www.cmegroup.com/company/history/timeline-of-achievements.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
17 CI. MERCANTILE EXCH. RULEBOOK § § 51S00, 51S03.B, 51S04.C [hereinafter
CME RULEBOOK].

18 See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 319-23.

304

ARBITRATION AND THE CONTRACT EXCHANGE

which this author has called a "consumer contract exchange."l 9
One form of consumer contract exchange is consumer-to-business. A
second form of consumer contract exchange is consumer-to-consumer. Each
will be considered in turn.

1. Consumer-to-Business ContractExchanges
The Internet has allowed contract exchanges for consumer-to-business
transactions to thrive. In general, consumer-to-business contract exchanges
enable consumers to make requests for a good or service and receive a
number of offers from businesses competing to fulfill the request. The result
is that consumers obtain attractive prices and rates.
Perhaps some of the most easily recognizable consumer-to-business
exchanges are travel service websites that provide a marketplace for fungible
travel services, such as a rental car or an airline ticket. Among the better
known are Priceline, where consumers "name their own price" (bid) for
travel services, and Hotwire, where travel providers make bids to consumers.
On Hotwire, a consumer enters basic information about the service
requested, and businesses present offers for the consumer to accept or
reject. 20 The consumer does not know the name of the company making each
offer. The consumer only learns the company's identity upon accepting its
offer. 2 1 Priceline reverses the offer and acceptance process: consumers make
the offer to an anonymous group of vendors by entering the price the
consumer is willing to pay. 22 If a vendor accepts the price, the identity is
revealed.
In contrast to Priceline and Hotwire, travel services websites such as
Expedia, Orbitz, or Kayak lack anonymity. Consumers accept offers
knowing the identity of the company behind each offer. Consumers may pay

19 Id. at 334-35.
20 See Terms of Use, HOTwIRE, http://www.hotwire.com/en/content/terms-use?cc=us

(last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
21 10

Tips

to

a

Great

Hotel

Rate,

CONSUMER

REPORTS,

http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine-archive/201 0/june/shopping/hotels/10tips-to-a-great-rate/index.htm (last updated Jun. 2010) (noting that on Priceline or
Hotwire, "the identity of your hotel doesn't become known until after you complete a
nonrefundable transaction").
22 Terms & Conditions, PRICELINE, http://www.priceline.com/privacypolicy/terms

en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
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more based on perceived brand value. 2 3 This difference separates a contract
exchange (like Hotwire) from an ordinary marketplace (like Kayak).
By keeping the brand opaque, Hotwire requires consumers to treat the
car rental like a generic commodity and compare offers purely on the basis of
price. Although there are small differences between the contracts (one hotel
room will likely differ slightly from another), the important consideration is
that the consumer, in deciding purely on price, treats them as if they were
identical. And for a consumer that prefers to deal with a specific company,
they can do so directly off the exchange, although almost certainly for a
higher price. 24
Priceline and Hotwire are not alone. Other consumer-to-business contract
exchanges exist today, such as MoneyAisle, a contract exchange for generic
consumer financial products, such as FDIC-insured certificates of deposit.

2. Consumer-to-Consumer ContractExchanges
On a consumer-to-consumer contract exchange, consumers make
contracts with one another or trade those contracts. This type of exchange is
available to consumers on the Internet and has thus only appeared in the past
few years, coinciding with the widespread adoption of high-speed Internet. 2 5
There are few real-life examples of consumer-to-consumer contract
23 See Susan Simpson & Jennifer Palmer, ProposalGreeted with Excitement, Worry

in Tulsa, OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 27, 2010, at I B (reporting on the differing brand identities
of car rental companies); see generally HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE ECONOMICS 448-

53 (5th ed. 1999) (noting that many firms "invest heavily in creating a distinctive brand
identity" so that they can obtain higher prices for their goods or services than is available
for commodified equivalents).
24 See 10 Tips to a Great Hotel Rate, supra note 21. Because contract exchanges

have efficiency advantages over other methods of contracting, we should expect that
consumers that use Priceline or Hotwire will obtain lower prices than are available
elsewhere. This is indeed borne out in practice: Consumer Reports has found that prices
obtained by consumers on Priceline and Hotwire are the most attractive anywhere, online
or off. WILLIAM J. McGEE, CONSUMER REPORTS WEBWATCH, BOOKING AND BIDDING IN
THE BLIND: AN IN-DEPTH EXAMINATION OF OPAQUE TRAVEL WEB SITES (2008),

at
available
bidding.cfn.

http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/dynamic/travel-report-booking-

25 Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2010, PEW RESEARCH INTERNET PROJECT, 6

(Aug.
11,
2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/201 0/Home%20broadband%
202010.pdf (reporting that the percentage of Americans with broadband Internet access
grew from 16% in 2003 to 66% in 2010, based on survey data).
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exchanges. Of those, "Prosper" and "Lending Club" are among the most
economically significant. 26 Founded in 2006, Prosper is "the largest peer-topeer lending marketplace" in the world. 2 7 Consumers pool their money online
to make small, unsecured loans to one another. 28 Prosper is open to anyone
who wishes to lend and borrowers with an adequate credit score. 29 To date,
more than one million consumers have joined Prosper, lending and
borrowing more than $200 million.30 Prosper charges borrowers and lenders
servicing fees, but the fees are generally lower than those charged by
traditional banks. 3 1
Prosper sets the interest rates based on the borrower's financial status and
credit history. 32 Lenders can put as little as $25 into a loan and, if enough of
them invest to meet the full amount sought by the borrower, then the loan
will fund and the borrower will make payments to each of the lenders over
the life of the loan.3 3 Apart from the amount and interest rate, all contractual
terms-term of loan, choice of law, acceleration clause, and the like-are

This discussion will focus on Prosper, but Lending Club is a similar business of
similar size.
27 Other peer-to-peer lending marketplaces include Lending Club and Zopa. See
26

Phyllis Furman, More Entrepreneurs Use the Web To Attract Lendors and Investors,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS,
(Dec.
14,
2009),

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/entrepreneurs-web-attract-lenders-investorsarticle-1.432740.
28 Company

Overview,

PROSPER

(Feb.

23,

2014,

1

PM),

http://www.prosper.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
29 Borrowers must meet the minimum credit score requirement of 640. Prosper's
SEC

Registration

Declared

Effective,

BusINEss

WIRE

(Jul.

14,

2009),

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20090714005330/en/ProsperE2%80%99sSEC-Registration-Declared-Effective. Nationally, credit scores range from 300-850, with
a median of 723. Kenneth R. Harney, New Mortgages Worry Regulators, WASH. POST,

June 10, 2006, at F3. Thus, a score of 640 indicates a borrower whose creditworthiness is
well below average bu't far from the worst.
30 Supra note 28.

31 Prosper charges borrowers a 3%servicing fee and lenders a 1%servicing fee, but
this approximately 1%or 2% transaction cost is likely a tighter spread than is usual for
traditional banks, which might pay depositors 1%and lend to them at 6%.
32 See Prosper Reports 17% Increase in Loans, LOAN SAFE (DEC. 20, 2010),

http://www.loansafe.org/prosper-reports- 17-increase-in-loans (announcing change).
33 Just like at the CBOT, there are actually two contracts, one between the lender
and Prosper, and another between Prosper and the borrower. But they function effectively
as a single contract; that is, if the borrower defaults, the lender suffers the loss.
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fixed in a standard form promissory note drafted by Prosper. 34 Prosper
operates both a primary market and a secondary market for promissory notes,
the latter in an apparent joint venture. It does not employ a clearinghouse or
margin, which makes sense in the context of a lending market.
Prosper delivers significant benefits to the consumers who choose to
participate: independent reports indicate that borrowers on Prosper receive
better interest rates than are available from a bank or other financial
institution, 35 and that lenders receive a relatively attractive rate of return on
their investments.

3. Quasi-ContractExchanges
There are number of websites that host marketplaces where consumers
make contracts with one another, yet do not strictly fit the definition of a
contract exchange given in Part II.A. Even so, it is worth noting these
marketplaces because they are closely related to true consumer contract
exchanges and may have lessons to teach. This Subsection will briefly
describe two such quasi-contract exchanges, eBay and Sittercity.
eBay is a giant online marketplace where consumers sell goods to one
another, often in an auction format. eBay is not a contract exchange as
defined above, but it is a close cousin. It is not a contract exchange simply
because the contracts between buyers and sellers on eBay are customizable
and negotiable in many ways, and the underlying goods for sale are not
uniform. Recall that uniformity of contract terms and underlying subject
matter is part of the definition of a contract exchange. 3 6
Even so, eBay is a close relative of a contract exchange because it
exhibits several of the attributes of contract exchanges. eBay contracts are
reliably enforceable. 37 Also, both members and nonmembers may observe
34 See

Sample

Promissory

Note,

PROSPER,

http://www.prosper.com/legal/promissory-note-sample/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
35 Chaddus Bruce, Got Cash? You Can Loan Money Like a Big-Time Banker,

WIRED
(May
9,
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/startups/news/2007/05/microlenders;
The

eBay

of

Loans,

FORBES

(Feb.

23,

2007),
Christopher Steiner,
2007),

http://

www.forbes.com/forbes/2007/0312/068.html.
36 See supra Part II.A.
37 See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 816-17 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(enforcing a contract consummated on eBay); Gossett v. HBL, LLC, No. 2:06-123-CWH,
2006 WL 1328757, at *4 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (same); see also Invalid Bid Retraction
Policy, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/invalid-bid-retraction.html
(last
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the live auctions and goods for sale on eBay. By letting all web users observe
the bids, asks, and transaction prices in real time, eBay benefits the general
public through price discovery. 38 For example, someone seeking to hold a
garage or yard sale might rely on eBay to determine reasonable prices for
household items. In this way, an active, liquid market on eBay not only
benefits participants but also can benefit the public. 39 In short, eBay is not
truly a consumer contract exchange, but it does possess some of the key
attributes of such exchanges and yields some of their benefits.
Similarly, babysitting website Sittercity is not exactly a consumer
contract exchange, but it does allow participants to utilize a central market
for services. On Sittercity, parents post caregiving jobs depending on their
needs, and caregivers can apply to those jobs that correspond to their skills. 40
Parents pay for membership, but caregivers may sign up for free to apply for
the posted positions. Sittercity facilitates those looking for, and those seeking
to provide services as, babysitters, au pairs, pet sitters, housekeepers, tutors,
and others, though babysitting is the heart of the business. Sittercity provides
background and identity checks, and parents (or other service seekers) are
able to check references, interview candidates, and post reviews. Once a
parent finds a suitable babysitter, they contact one another and make a
contract for a certain date and time and for a certain rate.
Sittercity is not exactly a contract exchange, because the services
provided are not fungible. One babysitter is not equivalent to any other in the
way that one bushel of wheat is effectively identical to every other. Still, it is
an online marketplace where consumers make contracts with one another, so
it is closely related to a contract exchange.

This part has introduced and examined the benefits of contract
exchanges, especially consumer contract exchanges. The next part claims
that arbitration is especially well suited to resolving disputes arising out of
visited Apr. 10, 2014).
38 Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92

MINN. L. REv. 803, 816 (2008).
39 eBay is certainly an active, liquid market-there are more than 90 [128] million
active traders on the site, and $2,000 worth of goods are sold every second. eBay: Who
We Are, EBAY, http://www.ebayinc.com/who we-are/onecompany (last visited on Apr.
10, 2014).
40 SITTERCITY, https://www.sittercity.com/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
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contract exchanges.
II. ARBITRATION HOLDS SPECIAL VALUE FOR CONTRACT EXCHANGES
Disputes that arise out of contract exchanges could be resolved in any
number of ways, including litigation. But there is reason to think that
arbitration is a particularly good fit for deciding contract exchange cases.
This Part briefly describes arbitration in general, and then claims that
arbitration holds special value for contract exchanges.

A. Arbitration in General
Arbitration is private dispute resolution, conducted by independent
decision makers hired and paid for by the parties. The decision rendered by
the third-party arbitrator(s) is a definitive and binding resolution, generally
with no appeal and limited judicial review.
Once parties have a legal dispute with one another, they have the power
to collectively decide to forego court and arbitrate instead. This is known as a
post-dispute arbitration agreement. More commonly, though, parties bind
themselves by contract, in advance of any disagreement, to arbitrate any
disputes that relate to that contract.
Courts are generally uninvolved in arbitrated cases; indeed, that is
precisely the point. However, because arbitration is a creature of contract,
courts may be called upon to scrutinize the parties' agreement to ascertain
whether their contract calls for arbitration, and precisely which type.41 Under
the FAA, courts also police whether the arbitral process was tainted by fraud
or corruption, or whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 42 Apart from
this sharply limited review, courts will not offer an appellate forum for
parties to arbitration.

41 Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (because
"arbitration is a matter of contract," "courts must 'rigorously enforce' arbitration
agreements according to their terms") (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470
U.S. 213, 221 (1985)).
42 9 U.S.C. § § 10(a)(1)-(4) (2014).
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1. NationalPolicy Presumedto FavorArbitration
Arbitration has its proponents, who focus on the cost savings compared
to litigation, and its detractors, who fear that the deck is stacked in arbitral
forums. 4 3 This essay will not, however, attempt to grapple with the question
of whether arbitration is efficient and fair as a general matter. Rather, this
essay will simply accept as given that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has
resolved the issue by announcing "a national policy favoring arbitration." 44

B. The Special Value ofArbitrationfor ContractExchanges
Arbitration is widely seen as valuable in many contexts, but it is
particularly well suited to contract exchanges for at least four reasons.4 5
43 Compare, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE 4-8, 32, 130-35 (2012)

(offering a critical view of arbitration), with, e.g., Miles B. Farmer, Note, Mandatoryand
Fair? A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2352-55 (2012)

(describing some benefits of arbitration); id. at 2352 n. 14 (collecting authorities: Samuel
Estreicher, Saturnsfor Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over PredisputeEmployment
ArbitrationAgreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 559, 563-64 (2001) (arguing that

mandatory arbitration allows many more plaintiffs to bring cases)); Dwight Golann,
Developments in Consumer FinancialServices Litigation, 43 Bus. LAw. 1081, 1091

(1988) ("The primary advantage for consumers in binding arbitration is that it offers at
least the possibility of a faster and cheaper decisionmaking mechanism for their
complaints."); Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 89, 89-90 (arguing that

arbitration reduces businesses' dispute resolution costs and that these savings are
ultimately passed on to consumers); see also Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276-77 (1982) (citing the speed and cost advantages of
arbitration); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favorof the Triumph of Arbitration,

10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 423 (2009) ("[Arbitration] fills wide gaps and
makes adjudication accessible to individuals by promoting economy and effectiveness
through the provision of expertise, basic fairness, and binding determinations.")).
44 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (the FAA reflects a "liberal policy
favoring arbitration"); see RADIN, supra note 43, at 132. The relevant provision in the
FAA provides that contractual arbitration clauses "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2014).
45 See also, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STuD. 115 (1992); Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854 (1978); Stewart
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1. Low Cost
First, recall that a foundational goal of contract exchanges is to lower the
cost of contracting. 46 Likewise, the fundamental purpose of arbitration is to
lower the cost of resolving disputes over those contracts. 4 7 One of the most
important drivers of contracting costs is the high cost of resolving contract
disputes through litigation.4 8 But that cost can generally be lowered if the
contracting parties agree in advance to mandatory arbitration. 4 9 On a contract
exchange, then, there would be good reason for the exchange to mandate that
any disputes arising out of exchange transactions be arbitrated, instead of
litigated.
Arbitration endeavors to keep costs down in a number of ways. For one
thing, arbitration clause can prevent (or at least discourage) forum shopping.
A contractual selection of the arbitral tribunal for dispute resolution functions
as a mandatory and exclusive forum-selection clause.5 0
For another, the informal procedures used in arbitration are designed
with efficiency in mind. In litigation, for instance, trials on the merits usually
only occur after discovery and motion practice," e.g., motions for summary
judgment, motions to exclude testimony, et cetera. These preludes to a
resolution of the dispute can easily consume a fair bit of time and money in
and of themselves, and one has not even advanced to trial yet. The informal
arbitration process, by contrast, generally eschews motion practice and tries
to get to the merits as soon as possible, potentially resulting in significant
cost savings for all concerned. 5 '
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc.
REv. 55 (1963).
46 See supra Part II.B.

47 Whether arbitration is always, sometimes, or never less expensive than litigation
is a matter of controversy in the academy. See supra note 43. For present purposes,
however, it is enough to observe that the goal of arbitration parallels the goal of contract
exchanges: to lower costs.
48 First, the cost of potential litigation must be impounded into the price a party can
afford to pay. Second, the drafting itself may be more careful and fulsome (and thus
expensive) if the cost of litigation is expected to be very high, so as to try to avoid that
eventuality.
49 E.g., Golann, supra note 43, at 1091.

50 That said, even the most thoughtfully drafted arbitration clause can be vulnerable
to challenge by a creative attorney. See infra Part IV.B. 1.
51 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION &

OTHER CLAIMS § 19:1 (2011).
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2. Use of Experts
Second, contract exchanges can also benefit by utilizing arbitrators with
relevant expertise. 52 As opposed to generalist judges who preside over most
litigation, it is possible to organize a stable of arbitrators who are expert in
the specific contracts traded, and any underlying goods on which they are
based. 53 This expertise could benefit all parties if it makes outcomes more
certain and easier to predict.

3. Certainty ofForum/Outcome
The types of disputes that arise out of an exchange's form contract are
likely to be broadly similar to one another, especially those involving an
interpretation of the contract itself. Hence, if all exchange-related disputes
were to be channeled to a single decision maker, the parties could have more
certainty as to the outcome than they would if the dispute were litigable in
any of a number of jurisdictions. 54
This certainty would be particularly powerful if arbitrators were to
publish written opinions explaining their reasoning, but that is not generally
the case.55 One important reason for the practice and tradition of arbitrators
declining to publish opinions is the "public good" nature of precedents: The
costs of generating the precedent are privately borne by the parties to the
arbitration, yet the benefits are a public good widely shared among all
interested persons.56
This "public good" problem, however, does not mean that arbitrators
have never and will never issue written opinions. To the contrary, since
arbitration is at bottom a matter of private ordering, parties are free to direct
their arbitrators to provide a written explanation of their awards.57
52 See generally Bernstein, supra note 45, at 115.

53 Schmitz, supra note 5, at 123, 136 & n.67.
54 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724,

1725 (2001).
55 JAY FOLBERG, ET AL., RESOLVING DISPuTES: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND LAW 599-

600 (2d ed. 2010).
56 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.

LEG. STUD. 235, 248 (1979).
57 FOLBERG, ET AL., supra note 55, at 600. Indeed, there are reports that commercial

arbitration agreements found in contemporary business contracts "often" call for written
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Furthermore, a contract exchange is precisely the type of group or
association that is best able to resolve the public good problem standing in
the way of written arbitral decisions.5 8 Members of a contract exchange
would all collectively benefit from written decisions, and may therefore
presumably be willing to "tax" themselves to pay for the extra cost associated
with written decisions. 59

4. Consolidation
Finally, an arbitral forum based at or associated with a contract exchange
is well placed to consolidate associated disputes. For example, a default on a
delivery would presumably affect many counterparties in much the same
way, and it would clearly make sense to resolve them collectively. This may
be possible to achieve in litigation via class actions, multi-district litigation
or in rem proceedings, but those are slow, expensive, and cumbersome
procedures. By contrast, an arbitral body can obtain essentially the same
result as these types of proceedings, but much more quickly and without the
complicated maneuvering necessary to litigation. 60

These theoretical notions appear to be borne out in practice. The next
Section will describe how real-world contract exchanges make much use of
arbitration.

explanations by arbitrators. Id at 599-600.
58 See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and
Coercion Under the FederalArbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REv. 931, 970-73 (1999); Amy
J. Schmitz, Consideration of "ContractingCulture" in Enforcing ArbitrationProvisions,

81 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 123, 125 (2007).
59 Landes & Posner, supra note 56, at 248 ("The situation with regard to the
incentives to produce precedents in a regime of private arbitration is different where
arbitration is prescribed by a tightly knit religious or commercial association which can
presumably 'tax' the membership to support rule creation by the association's judges.");
see also Schmitz, supra note 58, at 135.
60 See, e.g., KAN. CITY BD. OF TRADE RULEBOOK § 1228.00 ("In case of default on
any contract month's deliveries, when the transactions have been carried through the
Clearing House, the arbitration of all disputes in reference thereto shall be in one (1)
arbitration, so that all the controversies and rights of all parties for any one (1) month's
deliveries may be settled at one and the same time.").

314

ARBITRATION AND THE CONTRACT EXCHANGE

C. PracticalEvidence of this Special Value
The last Part made the claim that arbitration is well suited to resolving
disputes relating to contract exchanges. This Part provides evidence for that
claim by looking at the real world use of arbitration by existing contract
exchanges. First it will describe how the major commodities exchanges, such
as the CBOT, make extensive use of arbitration, and even have specific rules
against litigation. Then it will discuss how the New York Stock Exchange
and other stock exchanges likewise rely on Financial Industry Regulation
Authority (FINRA) arbitration to resolve exchange-related disputes. 6 1 As
will appear, this is both a matter of private ordering and regulatory flat.
The evidence considered in this Section is consistent with this Essay's
claim of a special relationship between arbitration and the contract exchange.

1. Commodities Exchanges
Traditional commodities contract exchanges use arbitration in two
distinct ways. First, as a matter of exchange rules (which are themselves a
form of contract), they generally require that members of the exchange
arbitrate any disputes they may have with other members. Second, both
pursuant to the federal Commodity Exchange Act and associated regulations
issued by the CFTC, commodities exchanges are legally obliged to provide
an arbitral forum where customers may seek redress against members of the
exchange.
a. Member-versus-Member Arbitration
Contracts created or traded on a commodities exchange may become the
subject of a dispute, just like any contract might. If, for instance, the butter
delivered under a CME contract turns out not to meet specifications, or is
late, the buyer would have a claim for breach of contract. Disputes such as
these are ordinarily the proper basis for litigation.
Nevertheless, the rules of these traditional contract exchanges
traditionally require that contract disputes between members be arbitrated,
rather than litigated. The relevant CBOT Rule begins with a simple and
broad policy statement that it is "contrary to the objectives and policy of the
61 Though they may not be "contract" exchanges, the arbitration of disputes between
investors and their brokers is relevant here to -show how arbitration fits well with
exchanges.
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Exchange for members to litigate claims" against one another over exchange
transactions. 62 The Rule then states that a variety of disputes "between and
among members . .. shall be subject to mandatory arbitration" by an internal
arm of the CBOT.
Most importantly, the Rule states that "claims between members that
relate to or arise out of any transaction on" the exchange must be arbitrated. 64
Members also must arbitrate claims relating to "trading rights on the
Exchange," non-compete clauses, and certain other matters. 6 5
Exchanges take the mandatory arbitration regime very seriously, as
indicated by the language used in their rules. It is an "offense" against the
CBOT for a member "to fail to submit to arbitration any dispute which
Exchange staff, an arbitration panel or the Board decides should be arbitrated
... or to fail to comply with a final arbitration award." 6 6 Furthermore, the
CBOT Rules provide: "A Member who commences a legal action against ...
another Member of the Exchange without first resorting to and exhausting . .
. mandatory arbitration . . . shall be deemed to have committed an act

detrimental to the interest or welfare of the Exchange." 6 7
The CBOT has been used as an exemplar here, but the other major
commodities exchanges have similar rules regarding mandatory arbitration
for intra-member disputes. For instance, the Rules of the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange state: "All disputes that arise out of trades, contracts, agreements
or other transactions . . . shall be settled by arbitration." 68 And the Rules of
the London Metals Exchange provide that "any dispute .. . arising out of any
Contract shall be referred to arbitration." 69 Other examples could be given. 70
62 CBOT RULEBOOK, supra note 3, § 600.A.
63 Id.

64 Id The CME and NYMEX have essentially identical rules in their respective
rulebooks, as all three exchanges are held by the CME Group.
65 Id. The Rule exempts certain types of disputes from mandatory arbitration:
"Nothing in this rule, however, shall require a member employee to submit to arbitration
any claim that includes allegations of a violation of federal, state or local employment
discrimination, wage payment or benefits laws."
66 CBOT RULEBOOK § 432(R) (2013).
67 CBOT RULEBOOK § 440 (2013).
68
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MINNEAPOLIS GRAIN EXCH. § 402.00. The
parties to the dispute may opt out of arbitration by express mutual consent.
69 LONDON METAL EXCH. RULEBOOK, Part 4 Contract Regulations § 10.1.
70

E.g., INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE RULEBOOK R. 20.02(b); see also Lisa
Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of Federal
Court-Annexed ArbitrationPrograms, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2249 (1993).
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In short, the major commodities exchanges generally require that
exchange-related disputes between exchange members be arbitrated. 7 1
b. Customer-versus-Member Arbitration
Members of traditional contract exchanges frequently create or trade
contracts on behalf of customers, as opposed to their own account.
Inevitably, disputes between members and their customers will arise from
time to time, and these disputes could be either litigated or arbitrated. Yet
federal law has long favored the arbitration of these disputes.
The federal Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974
requires commodities exchanges to make arbitration available for disputes
between customers and members, and that members submit to arbitration if a
customer so requests. 72 All traditional contract exchangeS73 must "provide a
fair, equitable, and expeditious procedure through arbitration or otherwise for
the settlement of customers' claims and grievances against any member." 74

2. Consumer ContractExchanges
The few consumer contract exchanges that currently exist make broad
use of arbitration (or other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms) to
resolve exchange-related disputes, just like their traditional brethren. This
provides further practical evidence that arbitration is particularly well suited
to all types of contract exchange. This Section offers a few examples of the
way in which a few real-life consumer contract exchanges employ
arbitration. 75
71 It appears that arbitrators for the traditional commodities exchanges do not
generally issue written opinions. See generally FOLBERG, supra note 55, at 599-600.

72 Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1987) (under CFTC
regulations, a contract market is obliged to "provide a procedure where the member must
arbitrate when called upon to do so").
73 For present purposes, the term "traditional contract exchange" is assumed to be
coextensive with "designated contract market," defined as a contract exchange that is
regulated by the CFTC pursuant to the Commodities Exchange Act. See 7 U.S.C. § 7
(2012). There are about fifty active designated contract markets in the country today,
including well-known ones like the CBOT, Minneapolis Grain Exchange and ICE.
74 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (2013).
75 For additional discussion of "Online Dispute Resolution," see, e.g., Amy J.
Schmitz, Access to Consumer Remedies in the Squeaky Wheel System, 39 PEPP. L. REv.
279, 324-28 (2012); Louis Del Duca et al., FacilitatingExpansion of Cross-BorderE-
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a. Prosper7 6
Prosper requires all exchange participants, both lenders and borrowers, to
sign highly detailed arbitration agreements. The agreements are not between
lenders and borrowers, but rather between Prosper and lenders, and between
Prosper and borrowers. And Prosper has distinct arbitration agreements for
each group.
The lender registration agreement includes an elaborate arbitration clause
for disputes between Prosper and lenders. The clause states that "[a]ny Claim
may be resolved, upon the election of both [Prosper] and [lender], by binding
arbitration."77 Hence lenders are not required to arbitrate against Prosper
unless they consent to do so once a dispute has arisen.
In contrast, the agreement that to which borrowers must agree allows
Prosper to force arbitration even absent consent: "Any Claim shall be
resolved, upon the election of either us or you, by binding arbitration." 78
That said, borrowers are able to opt-out of the arbitration provisions of the
agreement by sending to Prosper written notice of rejection within thirty days
of signing the agreement. 79 If borrowers choose to reject the arbitration
provision, they will not have the right to seek arbitration down the road.
Finally, as for direct disputes between exchange members, i.e., lenders
and borrowers, Prosper specifically forbids lenders to contact or in any way
seek collection of late payments by borrowers. 80 So there is no arbitration
permitted or required directly between lenders and borrowers.
Commerce, 1 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT'L AFF. 59 (2012).

76 For a general description of Prosper, see supra Part II.D.2.
77
Lender Registration Agreement, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/account/
common/agreement view.aspx?agreement typeid=8 (last updated Feb. 1, 2013)

(emphasis added).
78 Borrower Registration Agreement, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/account/

common/agreement view.aspx?agreementtype id=7 (last updated Feb. 1, 2013)
(emphasis added).
79
Id. at § 22(i). It is unknown how many borrowers mail this written notice, but it
seems likely to be very few, since almost none of them will read the agreement in the first
place. See Florencia IMarotta-Wurgler, Does IncreasedDisclosure Help? Evaluating the
Recommendations of the AL's "Principlesof the Law of Software Contracts", 78 U. CHI.
L. REv. 165, 168 (2011) (reporting on empirical finding that less than one percent of
users read such agreements).
8o Collection on Late Payments, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com/policies/lenderscollections.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) ("Under no circumstances should you
attempt collection on a late payment yourself.").
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b. eBay8 1
eBay has an in-house dispute resolution process that it calls "Buyer
Protection" for "when buyers claim to sellers that their item was not received
or the item they received was different from what was described in the
listing." 82 This "on-eBay resolution process is the primary avenue for settling
disputed eBay transactions." 83
Buyers have the option of electing Buyer Protection and are not obliged
to do so. 84 But once a case is filed with Buyer Protection, "Buyers and sellers
permit us to make a final decision, in our sole discretion, on any case that a
buyer files with eBay under the eBay Buyer Protection Policy."8 5
c. Sittercity 8 6
Sittercity's Terms of Use, to which all market participants must agree,
includes a terse and not entirely clear arbitration clause8 7 : "Any controversy,
claim, suit, injury or damage arising from or in any way related to" Sittercity
services "shall be settled by binding arbitration" in Chicago.88 Caregivers
and parents agree to the arbitration clause, within the Terms of Use, by
simply using the website.
The clause may be read to encompass all disputes between parents and
81 For a general description of eBay, including the important caveat that it is not,

strictly speaking, a consumer contract exchange, see supra Part II.D.3.
82 eBay Buyer Protection, EBAY, http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/buyerprotection.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2013); see also Del Duca, supra note 75, at 63-65.
83 eBay Buyer Protection, EBAY, http://ebay.com/help/policies/ebp-hub.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2014).
84
Id. ("To take advantage of the eBay Buyer Protection Policy, buyers should first
contact the seller and attempt to resolve the issue. If the buyer doesn't hear from the seller
or can't resolve the issue with the seller, they can file a case under the eBay Buyer
Protection Policy.") (emphasis added).
85 Id. eBay recently renamed this program the "eBay Money Back Guarantee," but
the substance of the program remains essentially the same. See eBay Buyer Protection is
now eBay Money Back Guarantee,EBAY, http://announcements.ebay.com/2013/10/ebay-

buyer-protection-is-now-ebay-money-back-guarantee (last visited May 9, 2014).
86 For a general description of Sittercity, including the important caveat that it is not
precisely a consumer contract exchange, see supra Part II.D.3.
87 Sittercity Terms of Use, SIRTEcrry, http://www.sittercity.com/terms (last updated
Oct. 21, 2013) (emphasis added).
88 Id. (emphases added).
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babysitters that make contracts via Sittercity, as those contracts and any
damages or injury that arise therefrom, are clearly "related to" Sittercity
services. This reading, while literal, may not be the intended one. For
instance, it would seem to call for arbitration for claims arising out of a
child's injury while under the care of a Sittercity caregiver. But the parties
likely would not want that to be covered by the clause.
In the end, the intended meaning of Sittercity's arbitration clause is not
apparent. But Sittercity has only been around for a few years, and over time
the clause may be clarified.
III. REGULATION OF EXCHANGE ARBITRATION
Traditional contract exchanges are regulated by various government
agencies, including the CFTC and the SEC, as well as "self-regulatory"
bodies, such as FINRA (who are themselves regulated). All aspects of the
exchange are regulated, including the use of arbitration to resolve exchangerelated disputes.
For the exchanges and their participants (who broadly seem to favor
arbitration), the regulation of their arbitration agreements and procedures has
various costs, 89 but it also has at least one very important benefit for them: It
provides comfort to a court that the arbitration agreement and process are
sufficiently fair for it to compel arbitration or confirm an arbitral decision. 90
This extra level of comfort may not be strictly necessary, however.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, federal courts are obliged to enforce
arbitration clauses pursuant to "the terms of the [parties'] agreement," "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 9 1 But those other grounds include, for instance, unconscionability,
so there is a chance that a court could refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement. However, if that agreement were previously approved by a
regulatory body, then the court-even if hostile to arbitration, as some seem

89 In addition to the private cost of compliance by regulated entities, there may be a
social cost of regulation arising out of agency capture and other regulatory pathologies.
See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and
Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 549, 550-51 (2002).

90 This Essay is focused on arbitration clauses at the "front-end" of arbitration. See 9
U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2014). The arbitration process as well as the review and confirmation of
arbitration award are beyond the scope of the present work. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10
(2014).
91 9 U.S.C. §§ 2-3 (2014).
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to be-is practically certain to enforce it. This is a major benefit to the
exchanges.
Section A of this Part pertains to traditional contract exchanges. It first
describes the current regulatory framework for arbitration arising out of such
exchanges then marshals case law to show that the courts are highly
respectful of arbitration clauses that have been approved by regulators.
Section B relates to consumer contract exchanges and thus treads on
thinner ground, for these exchanges are too new to have traditional ways of
doing things. There is no regulatory framework for consumer contract
exchange arbitration, and there is no case law on the subject either. Writing
on this blank slate, this Section ultimately concludes that regulation of
consumer contract exchange arbitration would not benefit these emerging
exchanges.

A. Regulation of TraditionalContractExchange Arbitration
The CFTC regulates and oversees the arbitration of disputes arising out
of commodities exchanges. The Commission does not review individual
arbitration hearings or decisions, but rather the broad process, to ensure that
it is generally fair. To that end, the CFTC has issued specific rules governing
consumer-versus-member arbitration.
Under the Commodities Exchange Act, an exchange must require that
their members submit to arbitration when called upon by a customer, 92 but
that the use of arbitration by customers "shall be voluntary." 93 Prior to the
1974 federal legislation, it was apparently commonplace for customers to be
asked to assent to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses "as a
precondition to doing business" with a member of a business contract
exchange. 94 "Indeed, this practice was found [by the CFTC] to be so
prevalent that a customer might effectively be frozen out of the futures
market if he refused to execute a pre-dispute agreement." 9 5 Hence, the CFTC
has construed this voluntariness requirement as to prohibit exchange
92 Geldermann, Inc. v. CFTC, 836 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1987) (under CFTC
regulations, a contract market is obliged to "provide a procedure where the member must
arbitrate when called upon to do so").
93 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10)(A) (2014) (the use of arbitration by a customer "shall be
voluntary").
94 Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174, 1178 (2d
Cir. 1977).
95 Id
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members from requiring customers to enter into mandatory arbitration
contracts as a condition of obtaining the member's services. 96
Customers may, if they wish, enter into mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements with these professionals, but to try to ensure that the
agreement is truly voluntary, the CFTC requires that the customer
"separately endorse the clause" and that it includes specific "cautionary
language" "printed in large boldface type." 97
CFTC regulations provide additional protections for customers. For one
thing, customers must be given "the opportunity to select the location of the
arbitration proceeding from among several major cities in diverse geographic

96 Gans v. Merrill Lynch Futures, Inc., 814 F.2d 493, 496 (8th Cir. 1987) ("The
Commission has sanctioned arbitration and promulgated regulations to assure that
arbitration agreements are fair and to protect customers from making an uninformed
decision to agree to arbitration."); Felkner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 800 F.2d 1466,
1469 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The CFTC wanted to encourage arbitration, but its regulations
reflect its concern over the adhesive and overreaching nature of arbitration clauses that
had been used by brokers and dealers trading in the contracts markets.").
97 17 C.F.R. § 166.5(c) (2014). The required text is as follows:
Three Forums Exist for the Resolution of Commodity Disputes: Civil Court
litigation, reparations at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and
arbitration conducted by a self-regulatory or other private organization.
The CFTC recognizes that the opportunity to settle disputes by arbitration may
in some cases provide many benefits to customers, including the ability to obtain an
expeditious and final resolution of disputes without incurring substantial costs. The
CFTC requires, however, that each customer individually examine the relative
merits of arbitration and that your consent to this arbitration agreement be voluntary.
By signing this agreement, you: (1) may be waiving your right to sue in a court
of law; and (2) are agreeing to be bound by arbitration of any claims or
counterclaims which you or [name] may submit to arbitration under this agreement.
You are not, however, waiving your right to elect instead to petition the CFTC to
institute reparations proceedings under Section 14 of the Commodity Exchange Act
with respect to any dispute that may be arbitrated pursuant to this agreement. In the
event a dispute arises, you will be notified if [name] intends to submit the dispute to
arbitration. If you believe a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act is involved
and if you prefer to request a section 14 "Reparations" proceeding before the CFTC,
you will have 45 days from the date of such notice in which to make that election.
You need not sign this agreement to open or maintain an account with [name].
See 17 CFR 166.5.
17 C.F.R. § 166.5(c)(7) (2014).
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regions." 9 8 For another, they must also be given the chance to select an
arbitral panel whose majority "are not members or associated with a member
of the designated contract market, . . . and that are not otherwise associated

with the designated contract market." 99
The SEC plays a similar oversight role with respect to securities
arbitration, but rather than issuing specific rules like the CFTC has done, the
SEC has deputized the self-regulatory organization FINRA, which handles
more than 95% of securities arbitrations. 0 0 FINRA is obliged under the
federal securities laws to file with the SEC its rules and regulations
governing securities arbitration and await SEC approval.' 0 ' Any changes to
FINRA arbitration rules would have to be published and put out for public
comment.102
1. A Benefit of Regulatory Oversight: Enhanced JudicialRespect
for Arbitration
The regulatory regime just described yields an important benefit for
contract exchange arbitration. By obtaining regulatory approval for their
arbitration clauses, commodities and securities exchanges receive increased
judicial respect for their agreements. A regulated arbitral regime can
encourage courts to enforce an arbitration clause, thus enhancing arbitration's
ability to provide a speedy and low-cost method of dispute resolution.
The judicial solicitude for a regulated arbitration can be seen in a series
of Supreme Court cases: Wilko v. Swan,103 Shearson/American Express v.
McMahonl 04 and Rodriguez De Quitas v. Shearson/American Express. 0 5 In
Wilko, decided back in 1953, the Supreme Court held that courts could not
compel arbitration of Securities Act claims on the ground that "arbitration
was inadequate as a means of enforcing the provisions of the Securities

98 17 C.F.R. § 166.5(c)(5)(i)(C) (2014).
99 Id.
100 Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities
Arbitration,76 U. CIN. L. REv. 493, 495 n.13 (2008).

101 David S. Ruder, Securities Arbitration in the Public Interest: The Role of

PunitiveDamages, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 69, 74 (1997).
102 Gross, supra note 100, at 512-513.
103 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
104 Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
105 Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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Act."1 0 6 But in the 1980s, the Supreme Court reversed itself, taking the
position in the two Shearson/American Express cases that arbitration actually
is an adequate forum to enforce Securities Act claims. 0 7
What changed between the 1950s and the 1980s to compel this
conclusion? In the 1950s, the SEC "had only limited authority over the rules
governing self-regulatory organizations (SROs)-the national securities
exchanges and registered securities associations-and this authority appears
not to have included any authority at all over their arbitration rules." 0 8 But
in 1975, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act to give the SEC
"expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures
employed by the SROs."' 0 9 These "intervening regulatory developments"
meant that SRO arbitration was now an adequate and permissible forum for
resolving Securities Act claims, and courts may properly compel arbitration
for such claims."10
Today, as a matter of doctrine, when a party challenges an arbitration
clause that complies with CFTC regulations as being unfair or
unconscionable, they generally lose on the theory that it would be wrong for
a court to second-guess the carefully calibrated regulatory scheme."' The
106 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228 (characterizing Wilko).
107 482 U.S. 220; 490 U.S. 477 ("Wilko was incorrectly decided").
108 482 U.S. at 233.
109 Id.

110 482 U.S. at 233; 490 U.S. at 483 (describing McMahon as "reject[ing] the Wilko
Court's aversion to arbitration as a forum for resolving disputes over securities
transactions, especially in light of the relatively recent expansion of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's authority to oversee and to regulate those arbitration
procedures").
Ill E.g., Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 683 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir. 1982)
(The "strict conditions imposed by the CFTC regulations assure that broker-customer
arbitration agreements are entered into voluntarily and are fair. The regulations therefore
meet the practical concerns as to relative bargaining power and broker overreaching that
underlay" the unconscionability doctrine); cf, e.g., Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke,
Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Because Congress has committed to the SEC
the task of ensuring that the federal rights established by the Securities Acts are not
compromised by inadequate arbitration procedures, we are bound by the Commission's
determination that the procedures at issue here are satisfactory. Any contrary holding
would frustrate this carefully crafted federal regulatory scheme."); id. ("[T]he extensive
regulatory oversight performed by the SEC ... compel[s] the conclusion that agreements
to arbitrate disputes in accordance with SEC-approved procedures are not unconscionable
as a matter of law . . . ."), overruled on other grounds by Ticknor v. Choice Hotels

Intem., Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001); Gonick v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 711
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contracts traded on traditional contract exchanges are clearly contracts of
adhesion, as that term is defined, and yet courts properly abstain from
applying the unconscionability doctrine (and unsettling them) because the
CFTC has approved them.
Consider, for example, the case of Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lambert
Inc.,1 12 in an opinion by then-Circuit Judge Breyer, is illustrative. In that
case, Ingbar had brought a federal civil action against Drexel, a commodities
brokerage firm for investments losses. At the time Ingbar opened his account
with Drexel, however, he had signed Drexel's two-page form contract, as
well as separately signed its arbitration clause that covered "any controversy"
between Drexel and he.1 3 He sought to argue that the arbitration clause was
"invalid" because he did not read the agreement, and therefore it was
"involuntary.""14
The court paid short shrift to Ingbar's arguments of invalidity and
ordered the parties to arbitrate. The court observed that "the strict conditions
imposed by the CFTC regulations assure that broker-customer arbitration
agreements are entered into voluntarily and are fair. The regulations therefore
meet the practical concerns as to relative bargaining power and broker
overreaching.""15
Many other cases like Ingbar could be recounted.11 6 The important point
is that the judiciary appears to give extra respect to an arbitration agreement
that has been pre-approved by a regulator. As such, regulated arbitration
agreements are more likely to be strictly enforced, all else being equal, which
is a clear benefit to those who favor arbitration.
2. The FederalArbitration Act May Be Sufficient on Its Own
The last subsection claimed that an arbitration clause that itself has been
approved by a regulator is practically certain to be strictly enforced out of
F. Supp. 981, 984 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("The Securities Exchange Commission has
specifically approved the arbitration procedures of the New York Stock Exchange ....
Plaintiffs' unconscionability argument thus fails."); Rudbart v. N.J. Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 688 (N.J. 1992) ("[J]udicial review of the fairness of negotiable
securities would be inconsistent with federal and state securities laws . . ...
112 Ingbar,683 F.2d at 605.

113 Id. at 604.
114 Id. at 604, 607.
115 Id. at 604.
116 See supra note 110.
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judicial solicitude for the regulatory process. True enough. But if the goal is
maximum legal certainty that an arbitration clause will be enforced by its
terms, it may well be that the protection offered by the FAA is enough. Or, at
least, the marginal additional level of legal certainty that regulatory approval
provides may not be worth the significant costs it imposes.
The FAA states that written arbitration clauses are "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable," 1 7 and must be enforced pursuant to their terms.1 18 Such a
clause may be denied enforcement, however, "upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."1 19
A series of recent Supreme Court cases, including Concepcion,120 StoltNielson,121 and Italian Colors,122 construes the FAA expansively. Among
other things, the FAA is now understood to nullify state law doctrines that
single out arbitration clauses for special adverse treatment. Importantly for
present purposes, neither the FAA nor this body of Supreme Court case law
takes any account of whether the arbitration clause at issue has been
approved by any regulatory authority (and in fact, in those cases, they were
not).
In American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, for example, the
Supreme Court held that a contractual arbitration agreement with a class
action waiver binds the contracting parties, even as to a federal antitrust
claim that would be economically infeasible to pursue on an individual
basis.1 23 The FAA alone protected this clause. Italian Colors built upon other
important Supreme Court cases, including Concepcionl24 and StoltNielson,125 which read the FAA as strongly favoring the enforcement of
arbitration clauses precisely as drafted.
But even the FAA, by its terms, empowers a court to decline to compel
arbitration on "such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract," 12 6 such as fraud, duress or unconscionability. Regulatory
117 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013).
118 Id. § 3.
119 Id. § 2.
120 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
121 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758,
1775 (2010).
122 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013).
123 Id
124 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
125 Stolt-Nielson, 559 U.S. at 1775.
126 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
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approval, by contrast, could possibly insulate arbitration clauses from
unconscionability and related attacks to an even greater degree. So there is a
substantive difference between the greater protections afforded by regulatory
approval versus the lesser protection provided by the FAA standing alone.
In conclusion, while the FAA standing alone opens the door to some
potentially costly judicial review of an arbitration agreement and process,
regulatory approval can provide an extra level of certainty. The value of that
additional quantum of comfort is possibly quite modest, however, at least
with the FAA and its key precedents in place, and the cost may be rather
high.

B. PotentialRegulation of Consumer ContractExchange Arbitration
The last Section described the regulation of traditional contract exchange
arbitration and the benefit that it provides. This Section tries to extrapolate
from that experience to the context of consumer contract exchange
arbitration.
There is presently no regulator that is tasked with overseeing consumer
contract exchanges, let alone consumer contract exchange arbitration, for the
simple reason that they have only recently come into existence. This lack of
regulation may benefit the exchanges in various ways, but it deprives them of
the shield from judicial review that regulatory approval can provide.
That shield has proved worthwhile, it seems, for traditional contract
exchanges, and there is reason to think it would have a similar effect for
consumer contract exchanges. These nascent exchanges, then, may welcome
regulation by relevant bodies, whether the SEC, the CFTC or perhaps the
newly formed Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 127

1. A Benefit of PotentialRegulatory Oversight: Enhanced Judicial
Respectfor Arbitration
Regardless of the precise form it takes, it is certainly possible for
consumer contract exchanges to come under the regulatory aegis of one
agency or another. And just as in the traditional context, this should provide
127

Prosper is already subject to SEC oversight, but some commentators suggest the

CFPB is a better alternative. E.g., Paul Slattery, Square Pegs in a Round Hole: SEC
Regulation of Online Peer-to-PeerLending and the CFPB Alternative, 30 YALE J. ON
REG. 233 (2013); Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Person-to-PersonLending, 45

U.C. DAvis L. REv. 445 (2011).
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at least one significant benefit to the exchanges by enhancing judicial respect
for their exchange arbitration agreements and procedures. And this effect is
especially important for consumer contract exchanges because "consumer
contracts" are precisely the type of contract most vulnerable to claims of
unconscionability and related doctrines.
Non-negotiable standard form consumer contracts, or "contracts of
adhesion," are subject to a special body of law that ordinary negotiated
contracts are not. 12 8 Pursuant to the unconscionability doctrine, courts are to
conduct a substantive review of the terms of adhesion contracts and, if they
find any such terms (or the agreement as a whole) to be "harsh or overly onesided," they are empowered to refuse enforcement in whole or part.12 9 As a
matter of doctrine, many courts apply a two-part test that requires a party to
establish both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability to succeed.
The procedural component refers to the manner of bargaining and drafting
the contract. The substantive component refers to the bargain that the parties
actually made in the end.
The arbitration clause is probably the most frequently challenged as
unconscionable,13 0 and some of these challenges are successful. For example,
in Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc.,13 1 players of the online video game
"Second Life" brought suit against the operator of the game for expropriating
their property. The game operator moved to compel arbitration based on an
arbitration clause found in the "Terms of Service" for Second Life.1 32 The
Terms of Service were a commonplace "clickwrap" contract of adhesion that
were offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The only way to gain access to
Second Life was to agree to the Terms of Service by clicking an "accept"
button.133
In response to the motion to compel arbitration, the players argued that it
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 354-57.
129 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) ("[F]orm ...
contracts are subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental fairness."); Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (When a contract is
adhesive, "the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should
be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so
unfair that enforcement should be withheld.").
130 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Services, 6 P.3d 669 (Cal.
2000).
131 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
132 Id. at 603.
133 Id. at 606.
128
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was "both procedurally and substantively unconscionable" and should not be
enforced.134 The Terms of Service being a contract of adhesion, the court
quickly found procedural unconscionabilityl 35 and moved on to a substantive
review of the arbitration clause. Taking careful stock of each aspect of the
clause,136 the court ultimately found "multiple defects" with it and refused to
enforce it.137
In short, thanks to the unconscionability doctrine, arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion are vulnerable to searching judicial review. And the
contracts that are created or traded on consumer contract exchanges are
clearly contracts of adhesion.138 So, there is a real possibility of intrusive
judicial review into every consumer contract exchange arbitration-which
would make the arbitral system unworkable.
This outcome can be avoided, this Essay suggests, through the shield of
regulatory oversight. Just as ex ante regulatory review can substitute for ex
post judicial review in the traditional context, so too can it with regard to
consumer contract exchanges. If a consumer contract exchange arbitration
agreement and process has been approved by a government regulator, courts
should extend their precedents and routinely deny unconscionability claims.
Regulatory oversight can benefit consumer contract exchanges by
garnering judicial respect for arbitration, but hopefully that oversight can be
flexible, given the developing nature of the market. As discussed supra in
Part III.C.2, the consumer contract exchanges that currently exist have
diverse arbitration clauses and employ arbitration in a variety of different
ways. Regulators should try to permit such experimentation in these early
years of this phenomenon and avoid a one-size-fits-all before the industry has
a chance to establish itself and its preferences.
134 Id. at 605.
135 Id. at 606-07.
136 Id. at 608-11.
137 Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 611 ("Taken together, the lack of mutuality, the costs
of arbitration, the forum selection clause, and the confidentiality provision that Linden
unilaterally imposes through the TOS demonstrate that the arbitration clause is not
designed to provide Second Life participants an effective means of resolving disputes
with Linden. Rather, it is a one-sided means which tilts unfairly, in almost all situations,
in Linden's favor."). Sometime after the Bragg case, Second Life changed several aspects
of the arbitration clause in its Terms of Service, apparently to respond to the concerns
expressed there. In a subsequent case, Evans v. Linden Research, Inc., the court
contrasted the new clause with the old one and indicated that the revised one was not
unconscionable. 763 F. Supp. 2d 735, 741-42 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
138 See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 316.
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2. The FAA is Likely Sufficient
Again, like the traditional contract exchanges, consumer contract
exchanges can consider the possibility of relying solely on the power of the
FAA to have their arbitration clauses "rigorously enforce[d]." 1 39 Regulatory
pre-approval would certainly help in this regard, but the costs of regulation
may be especially high in an emerging industry.
Compliance costs could be significant, both financially and in terms of
distractions from business goals. Moreover, consumer contract exchanges are
only just getting started, and it is impossible to know what the future holds.
Regulatory oversight in such circumstances could easily stifle innovation in
this emerging marketplace.
It is a close call whether consumer contract exchanges would welcome
regulation of their arbitration clauses. Arbitration clauses are at their most
vulnerable when they involve consumers, so regulatory approval would
potentially provide greater value here than in the traditional commodities
context. 140 However, this industry is in an embryonic phase, so it is
important not to box it in to pre-existing categories, to the detriment of all.
In the end, the overriding importance of freedom and flexibility seems to
counsel that consumer contract exchanges should rely on the FAA, for now,
to protect their arbitration clauses, and not invite regulatory oversight on this
point. While regulation of consumer contract exchange arbitration would
engender a high level of judicial respect for outcomes and awards, the
downsides appear to outweigh this benefit. It is important to let this nascent
field develop organically, and it would be unwise to fetter it with concepts
and rules that derive from a different place and time. Furthermore, the FAA
as presently understood provides strong protection to arbitration and
arbitration clauses.
V. CONCLUSION
This Essay claimed that arbitration holds a special value for contract
exchanges as a matter of theory and showed that the existing traditional and
consumer contract exchanges make much use of arbitration in practice. It
demonstrated that government regulation of exchange arbitration can lead to
enhanced judicial respect for arbitration clauses, as has been the case in

139 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
140 Schwartz, supra note I at 354-57.
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traditional contract exchanges. For consumer contract exchanges, however,
this Essay concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act likely provides
sufficient protection to arbitration clauses and that regulation of such clauses
would not be appropriate at this time.
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